San Diego Unseen: An Urban Portrait
A secret diplomatic cable released by WikiLeaks on May 19 revealed a reported cartel sniper plot in which two Mexican police officers and a naturalized American citizen planned to assassinate U.S. Drug Enforcement agents in Tijuana.
The confidential state-department cable (see below), sent on Dec. 24, 2008, by the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, explains how the trio schemed to identify DEA agents living in a high-rise apartment behind the Consulate General's building. The plan, relayed by a usually reliable informant, was to "make the first attack 'count,' with the ultimate goal of getting DEA removed from Tijuana." One of the trigger men reportedly received his sniper training from San Diego County Sheriff's Office in the late 1990s.
It doesn't appear that the plot ever came to fruition. The apartment building didn't actually house any DEA agents.
"It’s an interesting case," says Howard B. Campbell, an anthropology professor at University of Texas at El Paso, who specializes in Mexico and drug trafficking. "WikiLeaks is revealing all these things that have been going on for so long. We’re getting the information with quite a bit of lag time, but it helps us understand how the whole thing works."
The informant alleged that he overheard the plot while dining with Baja California Ministerial Police Officer Oscar Lopez in early December 2008. Lopez got a call from an Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) enforcer named Enrique Jorquera, a naturalized U.S. citizen and San Diego resident who, at the time, reportedly led a cartel cell called the "Hitlers." According to the cable, here's what the informant overheard:
The informant identified Vizais as a Mexican police officer who doubled as a cartel enforcer and assassin.
"He used to be a Policía Ministerial and he said when he was captured that he works for the Arellano cartel, headed by Fernando Sanchez Arellano, and that he was under the orders of Melvin Gutierrez Quiroz, another AFO member from the United States," Navarro writes via email. "It is very probable that the Vizais in the cable is, indeed, the son. Actually his father was considered a good cop who was killed 'by mistake.'”
Navarro notes that Jorquera is still at large.
The informant passed a polygraph test and was considered very reliable, having provided credible tips for more than eight years. Nevertheless, Campbell thinks the story was probably bogus, but at the very least unusual, since the cartels largely learned their lesson from the U.S. backlash after the murder of undercover DEA Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985.
"Since the plot didn't happen, it's kind of conjecture as to whether it was very serious or not," he says. "But, the fact that anyone said this and it became a WikiLeaks cable, means there's some sort of reality to it, or perceived reality."
The San Diego County Sheriff's Office could not respond to the allegations in the memo. The consulate did not respond to emailed inquiries.
Last week, WikiLeaks published another Embassy Mexico cable (see below) from January 2010, which outlined the nine conclusions of a team of Mexican and American law-enforcement officers after a two-day security assessment in San Diego and Tijuana in December 2009. Locally, participants included the San Diego Police Department, the Chula Vista Police Department and the San Diego Sheriff's Office.
The report states that personality conflicts are hampering inter-agency coordination in Mexico and that there's a growing frustration with Mexican courts' inability to secure convictions. Mexican local police are described as "rich in manpower, institutionally weak, and easily corrupted," while at the same time in great need of U.S. support in terms of training and equipment. There was consensus that Tijuana is in "crying need" to change the perception of the city, both internally and externally.
SNIPER MEMO
SECURITY ASSESSMENT CABLE
The confidential state-department cable (see below), sent on Dec. 24, 2008, by the U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, explains how the trio schemed to identify DEA agents living in a high-rise apartment behind the Consulate General's building. The plan, relayed by a usually reliable informant, was to "make the first attack 'count,' with the ultimate goal of getting DEA removed from Tijuana." One of the trigger men reportedly received his sniper training from San Diego County Sheriff's Office in the late 1990s.
It doesn't appear that the plot ever came to fruition. The apartment building didn't actually house any DEA agents.
"It’s an interesting case," says Howard B. Campbell, an anthropology professor at University of Texas at El Paso, who specializes in Mexico and drug trafficking. "WikiLeaks is revealing all these things that have been going on for so long. We’re getting the information with quite a bit of lag time, but it helps us understand how the whole thing works."
The informant alleged that he overheard the plot while dining with Baja California Ministerial Police Officer Oscar Lopez in early December 2008. Lopez got a call from an Arellano Felix Organization (AFO) enforcer named Enrique Jorquera, a naturalized U.S. citizen and San Diego resident who, at the time, reportedly led a cartel cell called the "Hitlers." According to the cable, here's what the informant overheard:
JORQUERA advised LOPEZ that 'INGE' (identified as the current AFO leader Fernando SANCHEZ-Arellano) had authorized another AFO enforcer named Gerardo VIZAIS aka MONSTER to locate and kill someone from the 'Tres Letras' (Term commonly utilized by drug traffickers when referring to DEA). Per the [Confidential Source], JORQUERA stated SANCHEZ-Arellano knew DEA existed in Tijuana and that DEA was responsible for sending Government of Mexico (GOM) authorities from Mexico City to Tijuana to arrest the leaders of the AFO. Therefore, JORQUERA was calling LOPEZ to have him assist VIZAIS with locating and targeting the DEA agents... JORQUERA further stated that if one or two agents were located and killed, DEA would move all agents out of Tijuana.To summarize in plain English: Cartel leader Fernando "Inge" Sanchez-Arellano had assigned Gerardo "Monster" Vizais to kill a DEA agent or two. Jorquera, who takes orders from Sanchez-Arellano, then called Lopez and told him to help Vizais. Lopez's phone number was even included in the cable.
The informant identified Vizais as a Mexican police officer who doubled as a cartel enforcer and assassin.
The CS [Confidential Source] also advised that VIZAIS is a former Baja California State Ministerial Officer who was trained as a sniper by the San Diego Sheriffs Office in 1998 or 1999. The CS stated VIZAIS is allegedly the individual who shot and killed 3 people in October 2008, from a distance, outside the GOM Naval base in Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico. Those subjects were murdered because the AFO believed they worked with Eduardo GARCIA-Simental aka TEO.We initially reporter that there was a strange inconsistency in the report, since the San Diego Union-Tribune had reported that a police officer named Gerardo Vizais had been killed a month before the informant came to the DEA. Adela Navarro, an editor at the Tijuana newspaper Zeta, tells us the sniper was likely his son, Gerardo Vizais Castañeda, also a police officer. Zeta reported that younger Vizais was arrested with two other members of the cartel in February 2009. Zeta's report also links Vizais to a triple murder in Ensenada.
"He used to be a Policía Ministerial and he said when he was captured that he works for the Arellano cartel, headed by Fernando Sanchez Arellano, and that he was under the orders of Melvin Gutierrez Quiroz, another AFO member from the United States," Navarro writes via email. "It is very probable that the Vizais in the cable is, indeed, the son. Actually his father was considered a good cop who was killed 'by mistake.'”
Navarro notes that Jorquera is still at large.
The informant passed a polygraph test and was considered very reliable, having provided credible tips for more than eight years. Nevertheless, Campbell thinks the story was probably bogus, but at the very least unusual, since the cartels largely learned their lesson from the U.S. backlash after the murder of undercover DEA Agent Enrique Camarena in 1985.
"Since the plot didn't happen, it's kind of conjecture as to whether it was very serious or not," he says. "But, the fact that anyone said this and it became a WikiLeaks cable, means there's some sort of reality to it, or perceived reality."
The San Diego County Sheriff's Office could not respond to the allegations in the memo. The consulate did not respond to emailed inquiries.
Last week, WikiLeaks published another Embassy Mexico cable (see below) from January 2010, which outlined the nine conclusions of a team of Mexican and American law-enforcement officers after a two-day security assessment in San Diego and Tijuana in December 2009. Locally, participants included the San Diego Police Department, the Chula Vista Police Department and the San Diego Sheriff's Office.
The report states that personality conflicts are hampering inter-agency coordination in Mexico and that there's a growing frustration with Mexican courts' inability to secure convictions. Mexican local police are described as "rich in manpower, institutionally weak, and easily corrupted," while at the same time in great need of U.S. support in terms of training and equipment. There was consensus that Tijuana is in "crying need" to change the perception of the city, both internally and externally.
SNIPER MEMO
ID |
08TIJUANA1253 |
SUBJECT |
EAC AMCONSULATE TIJUANA - REPORTED THREAT OF PLANNED SNIPER |
DATE |
2008-12-24 23:59:00 |
CLASSIFICATION |
CONFIDENTIAL |
ORIGIN |
Consulate Tijuana |
TEXT |
184881 2008-12-24 23:59:00 08TIJUANA1253 Consulate Tijuana CONFIDENTIAL VZCZCXRO5003 PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS DE RUEHTM #1253/01 3592359 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 242359Z DEC 08 FM AMCONSUL TIJUANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8127 INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5085 RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0870 TAGS: ASEC PINS CASC SNAR MX C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TIJUANA 001253 SENSITIVE NOFORN SIPDIS DEPT FOR DS, DS/IP/WHA, DS/TIA/PII, CA, MEXICO CITY FOR RSO E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/24/2018 TAGS: ASEC PINS CASC SNAR MX SUBJECT: EAC AMCONSULATE TIJUANA - REPORTED THREAT OF PLANNED SNIPER ATTACK REF: DS/IP/WHA E-MAIL DATED 12/24/2008 TIJUANA 00001253 001.2 OF 004 CLASSIFIED BY: Angela D. Arroliga, Regional Security Officer, US Consulate General Tijuana, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (c), (g) CLASSIFIED BY: Angela D. Arroliga, Regional Security Officer, US Consulate General Tijuana, Department of State. REASON: 1.4 (c), (g) 1.(SBU) On December 22, 2008, Post's Emergency Action Committee (EAC) Law Enforcement Subgroup (LEWG) met to discuss the investigation of a reported threat against DEA Special Agents assigned to Post. Post's Core EAC members had telephonically discussed the threat on December 20, 2008, when information was received that a drug cartel was planning a sniper attack against DEA agents working in Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. EAC participants included CG, DHS-ICE, DEA, RSO, and CONS. THREAT SUMMARY 2. (SBU) Post law enforcement agency representatives (DHS-ICE, DEA, RSO) informed the EAC that, working in a joint effort since December 20, 2008, they had investigated the claimed "sniper" attack plan. On December 19, 2008 a Source of Information (SOI) contacted DEA Tijuana claiming that he overheard a sniper shooting was planned by a member of the Arrellano-Felix drug cartel (AFO), against any DEA agent assigned to the USCG Tijuana. The Subject planning the sniper attack said the majority of DEA agents live in the brown, high-rise apartment building right behind the U.S. Consulate building. The Subject said they would be able to identify the DEA agents since they were "Chicano" or "Puerto Rican", drove vehicles with Consulate plates, and were not armed. INVESTIGATION OF THREAT 3. (C/NF) On December 20, 2008, DEA and RSO agents interviewed the SOI on the reported threat, and obtained detailed information. Details of the SOI debriefing are at the end of this cable. As recommended by the EAC/LEWG, on December 23, 2008 the SOI underwent a Polygraph examination conducted by DEA San Diego Field Office, asking whether the SOI had overheard the conversation about the planning of a sniper attack against DEA agents working in Tijuana. The SOI passed the Polygraph, corroborating the reported threat information. Additionally, the SOI has been a reliable Confidential Source for DEA for approximately eight years and has provided reliable information in the past for several criminal investigations. 4. (SBU) There are no DEA or DHS-ICE agents housed in the brown, high-rise apartment building immediately behind the USCG Tijuana main building. However, there used to be a DEA agent from Puerto Rico living in a the apartment building who left about three years ago. The apartment does include three Mission residence apartments for three Foreign Service Officers (FSOs). None of the FSOs housed in the apartment building resemble the profile of male of Latino heritage, as two are males with light coloring (GSO, CONS) and one is female (RSO). RSO's spouse residing in the apartment building is of Latino heritage, but does not use Consular license plates. Housing for the agents of DEA, DHS-ICE, and ARSO, who may resemble the target profile, is in a different area of Tijuana, not near the apartment building. 5. (C/NF) Based on the results of the joint investigation, Post's law enforcement representatives, with the assistance of DHS-ICE San Diego and the DEA San Diego Field Office Arellano-Felix Task Force (AFO-TF), have been identified the Subjects named by the SOI as known drug cartel members. The SOI learned the information from hearing one side of a cell phone conversation and from one participant's statements, rather than hearing both sides of the attack planning discussion. The SOI provided names mentioned by the Subject, including a former TIJUANA 00001253 002.2 OF 004 State of Baja California Ministerial police officer who was previously trained as a sniper by San Diego Sheriff's office. The Subjects are known to be either current or former state-level law enforcement officers in Tijuana, so care must be taken in requesting GOM police support for protection of personnel or for any investigative or counter-surveillance operations. 6. (SBU) Proactive investigation continues in the San Diego and Tijuana areas with the goal of disrupting the attack and arresting the planners. From previous investigative of the Subjects named by the SOI , DEA agents believe them to be disciplined drug cartel members who will "do their homework" by spending one or two weeks identifying and locating DEA agents to target, with It is not consistent with the Subject group to send an amateur to shoot indiscriminately at any resident of the apartment building or driver of a Consular plated vehicle, without first determining whether they appear to be a DEA agent. The Subject would make the first attack "count", with the ultimate goal of getting DEA removed from Tijuana, instead of wasting their "one shot" on a non-DEA Consulate employee. However, Subjects may not be able to determine which Post law enforcement agents are from DEA, or DHS-ICE, or RSO since each agency has Latino male agents assigned to USCG Tijuana. POST RESPONSE SUMMARY 7. (SBU) Since December 20, 2008 the following actions for protection of personnel are being taken with the recommendation of the EAC and RSO Mexico City. Surveillance Detection (SD) Team coverage is adjusted beyond business hours to include the apartment building in back of the USCG main building. ARSO/Inv, RSO/SD Coordinator, and Post's law enforcement agency representatives have re-assessed areas of vulnerability for sniper attack from various directions, including continuing review of area from high vantage points. As requested, additional Tijuana Municipal police coverage has been provided supplementing the 24/7 uniformed police officers with added marked patrol units during active hours. The Consul General and RSO section members met with the Tijuana Director of Public Safety of Tijuana in order to renew contacts and confirm response capabilities, without providing details of threat. Separate meetings and telephone contacts have been made with the Tijuana Municipal Police Supervisor, and with the State police counterparts, without providing details, but to update react plans. 8. (SBU) EAC/LEWG concurred that the additional protective measures appear consistent with the level of threat information available at this stage of the investigation. EAC/LEWG members are keeping in close contact with their local U.S. and Mexican contacts regarding any new development or any unusual persons or events in or around the apartment building or the USCG main building. DETAILS - INTERVIEW of SOI 9. (SBU) Post DEA section has sent a cable through their channels and provided the text to RSO section as it details the Interview of the SOI. The text from the DEA cable follows in paragraphs 10 through 18. Begin Quote: 10. (U) On 12-19-08, CS-01-103562 (CS) contacted XXXXXXXXXXXX regarding a possible threat to DEA agents working in Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico. 11. (SBU) On 12-20-08 XXXXXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXXXXX, and XXXXXXXXXXXX TIJUANA 00001253 003.2 OF 004 XXXXXXXXXXXX met with and debriefed the CS regarding the aforementioned threat. The CS advised that on 12-19-08 s/he was at a restaurant in the company of a former Baja California State Ministerial Officer named Oscar LOPEZ. While together, LOPEZ received a telephone call from ARELLANO-Felix Organization (AFO) enforcer, Enrique JORQUERA. LOEZ received the call via his Nextel radio (approximately 4:30 pm) and the CS was able to overhear the entire conversation. 12. (SBU) JORQUERA advised LOPEZ that "INGE" (identified as the current AFO leader Fernando SANCHEZ-Arellano) had authorized another AFO enforcer named Gerardo VIZAIS aka MONSTER to locate and kill someone from the "Tres Letras" (Term commonly utilized by drug traffickers when referring to DEA). Per the CS, JORQUERA stated SANCHEZ-Arellano knew DEA existed in Tijuana and that DEA was responsible for sending Government of Mexico (GOM) authorities from Mexico City to Tijuana to arrest the leaders of the AFO. Therefore, JORQUERA was calling LOPEZ to have him assist VIZAIS with locating and targeting the DEA agents. 13. (SBU) JORQUERA further stated that if one or two agents were located and killed, DEA would move all agents out of Tijuana. LOPEZ was told that they believed the majority of DEA agents lived in a brown high rise apartment building located behind the U.S. Consulate (NOTE: This building is in the Consulate housing pool, but no DEA employees currently reside there. However, several Department of State (DOS) employees currently reside in the building.) 14. (SBU) JORQUERA stated the DEA agents would be easy to identify because they were all "Chicanos" (Term used to describe people of Mexican descent born in the United States) or "Puerto Ricans." Additionally, JORQUERA told LOPEZ the DEA agents would be easy targets because they travel in vehicles with Consular plates and are not armed. 15. (SBU) The CS provided the following additional details regarding JORQUERA, LOPEZ, and VIZAIS. The CS knows JORQUERA to be the current leader of an AFO enforcement cell known as the "HITLERS." JORQUERA was formerly the top lieutenant of Jorge BRISENO-Lopez aka CHOLO. However, after BRISENO was presumably killed on the orders of the AFO hierarchy, JORQUERA took over for BRISENO. JORQUERA now works directly under Fernando SANCHEZ-Arellano aka EL INGE. The CS believes JORQUERA is a Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident and lives in San Diego, CA (NOTE: A query of the Immigration indices conducted by the Tijuana U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Attache office revealed JORQUERA is a naturalized United States Citizen). 16. (SBU) The CS also advised that VIZAIS is a former Baja California State Ministerial Officer who was trained as a sniper by the San Diego Sheriffs Office in 1998 or 1999. The CS stated VIZAIS is allegedly the individual who shot and killed 3 people in October 2008, from a distance, outside the GOM Naval base in Ensenada, Baja California, Mexico. Those subjects were murdered because the AFO believed they worked with Eduardo GARCIA-Simental aka TEO. 17. (SBU) The CS provided LOPEZ' cell phone number as (52 664-126-0407 and LOPEZ' Nextel radio Identification number as 152*152782*3. 18. (SBU) The CS advised there was no mention of a time frame of when the threat was to be carried out. However, the CS has been tasked to attempt to obtain more details. End Quote. 19. (U) Post RSO section will update Post management, the EAC, RSO Mexico City, DS/IP/WHA, and DS/TIA/PII as needed as the TIJUANA 00001253 004.2 OF 004 investigation continues throughout the holiday time period. Post EAC will convene as soon as developments warrant. For comments or questions, please contact RSO at 011-52-664-622-7464, or 7451. KRAMER SIGNATURE |
HEADER |
VZCZCXRO5003 PP RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS DE RUEHTM #1253/01 3592359 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 242359Z DEC 08 FM AMCONSUL TIJUANA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8127 INFO RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 5085 RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RUEHTM/AMCONSUL TIJUANA 0870 XTAGS: XTAGASEC, XTAGPINS, XTAGCASC, XTAGSNAR, XTAGMX, XTAGASEC, XTAGPINS, XTAGCASC, XTAGSNAR, XTAGMX 08TIJUANA1253 |
TAGS |
ASEC PINS CASC SNAR MX ASEC PINS CASC SNAR MX |
ADDED |
2011-05-18 19:30:00 |
STAMP |
2011-05-19 14:27:24 |
VOTE_POINTS |
0 |
VOTE_COUNT |
0 |
VOTE_RATING |
0 |
PRIORITY |
PP |
TWEETS |
0 |
MANUAL |
N |
SITELINK |
|
ISNEW |
Y |
FINGERPRINT1 |
518832a7d1fd0ed6071c35f1e94502d9 |
SECURITY ASSESSMENT CABLE
ID |
10MEXICO45 |
SUBJECT |
Tijuana Bilateral Assessment |
DATE |
2010-01-12 22:35:00 |
CLASSIFICATION |
CONFIDENTIAL |
ORIGIN |
Embassy Mexico |
TEXT |
243326 2010-01-12 22:35:00 10MEXICO45 Embassy Mexico CONFIDENTIAL 10MEXICO3468|10TIJUANA1275 VZCZCXYZ0005 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHME #0045/01 0122235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 122235Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0028 INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX C O N F I D E N T I A L MEXICO 000045 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/01/12 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX SUBJECT: Tijuana Bilateral Assessment REF: TIJUANA 1275; MEXICO 3468 CLASSIFIED BY: Carlos Pascual, Ambassador, DOS, EXEC; REASON: 1.4(B), (D) 1. (SBU) SUMMARY AND NEXT STEPS: One of the early fruits of the new security policy coordination mechanism with Mexico has been an agreement to focus our joint efforts on the border cities where the most violence occurs and where the DTOs have carved out the greatest operating space. As part of this effort an unprecedented joint team representing all U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies traveled to Tijuana and San Diego to conduct an assessment of security and review opportunities for increased bilateral cooperation. In its two-day visit the team came away with the following key judgments: -- Presidential focus: The joint assessment and increased cooperation on the border is greatly helped by the express support of President Calderon. -- Mexican interagency coordination is improving both in Tijuana and the DF, yet it is still too tied to personalities and under-institutionalized. -- Judicial prosecutions lagging: Frustration in Tijuana is rising over the inability of the federal judiciary to produce convictions. -- Social fabric strained: The recession, ineffective schools, and the transient nature of Tijuana's population work in the DTOs' favor. The GOM is not certain how to integrate Pillar IV (Build Strong and Resilient Communities) into its broader drug strategy and is still uncomfortable with NGOs. -- Assistance requests modest: Mexican interlocutors identified discrete areas where they believe the USG can help: some technology, lots of intelligence sharing, limited equipment (armored cars, ballistic vests), training (aimed at managing police forces rather than how to do operations), and support to vetting processes. -- State and local forces are critical (and weak): State and local law enforcement know their beat better than federal counterparts and must be included in the equation if public security is to improve. They are rich in manpower, institutionally weak, and easily corrupted; they must be made more effective. -- Task force model: The San Diego meeting drove home the utility of the task force approach to investigations. The GOM will be receptive to exchanges and visits on this key model -- and perhaps also to detail more staff to task forces stateside. -- Centrality of Control de Confianza: The importance of vetting and internal controls was made clear by U.S. entities and GOM officials accepted this premise. -- Strategic communications: Both sides agreed that there is a crying need to change the perception of the outside world with regards to Tijuana, and to change the perception of the citizens of Tijuana about law and order. Public diplomacy efforts have been weak to date and must be a key part of any program. 2. (SBU) NEXT STEPS: We will wait to see what comes out of the assessment of Ciudad Juarez/El Paso and then develop an interim program to support the needs of the GOM in taking back the Tijuana and Juarez DTO corridors. We will have a preliminary joint plan to present to the Policy Coordination Group in late January and a more focused plan to present to the High Level Group in February. NAS and AID will conduct more detailed assessments by Training, Judicial, Civil Society, IT, and Control de Confianza program coordinators once the Juarez/El Paso assessment is completed, and begin to look at specific programs which could be quickly implemented. A critical first step will be to place a full-time program coordinator in each city to manage the emerging programs. END SUMMARY. BILATERAL TEAM CONCEPT - 3. (SBU) High-level bilateral discussions over the past several months have produced agreement to focus on targeted cooperation in frontline Mexican border cities. We have agreed to pilot new cooperative strategies initially in Tijuana/San Diego and Ciudad Juarez/El Paso. Our joint objective is to demonstrably degrade drug trafficking organizations (DTOs), decrease violence, recognize and disseminate current best practices, and build models readily applicable elsewhere in Mexico. The GOM has insisted that we approach the assessments in a balanced fashion with issues on both sides of the border acknowledged and factored in as we develop new programs. 4. (SBU) A GOM-USG bilateral assessment team, chaired by the Ambassador and CISEN Director General Valdes, traveled to Tijuana December 3 and San Diego December 4. The Mexican delegation was comprised of high-ranking representatives from CISEN, PGR, SEMAR, SEDENA, SRE, Hacienda, and SSP. The U.S. delegation included USAID, DHS, ICE, CBP, OPAD, DAO, ODC, FBI, State, NSC, and ConGen Tijuana. In both locations we focused on law enforcement in the morning and civil society in the afternoon. In setting the scene for the team, the Ambassador asked for particular focus on sharing best practice, relationships between the military and the three levels of government, and seeking ways to better use real-time intelligence to guide operations. Valdes emphasized co-responsibility in confronting a transnational threat running from Colombia to the U.S., noted the southbound flow of arms and cash, and underscored the direct interest of President Calderon in the endeavor. TIJUANA SECURITY IMPROVING BUT FRAGILE -- 5. (SBU) Baja California Norte Governor Jose Osuna Millan hosted the bilateral team December 3 in Tijuana. SEDENA and SEMAR regional commanders, state SSP, state PGR, Tijuana Public Security Secretary Julian Leyzaola, and representatives from the Governor's office participated in the discussions. The Governor's technical secretary led with a briefing on the situation on the ground. Baja California Norte beats the Mexican average on education, employment and GDP per capita but as a migrant entry point and an industrial city of working parents, its social fabric is strained. The proximate cause of the spike in violence was Mexican success against leaders of the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), which splintered and saw Sinaloan rivals move in, sparking a fight to control border crossing routes. After a terrible 2008, violence in Baja California Norte state subsided somewhat in 2009, with Tijuana's share of Mexico's total killings dropping from 11% to 4%. High impact crimes including kidnapping, car theft, and homicide are down significantly. Yet the turnaround is not complete, and 40 police had died statewide through early November, close to the 49 officers lost in 2008. NOTE: Just after the bilateral team visit, a truce between elements of the AFO disintegrated, unleashing a new wave of killings (ref A). END NOTE. 6. (SBU) Governor Osuna said Mexican forces had launched an offensive against the DTOs via the Baja California Coordination Group (state and federal SSP, state preventative police (PEP), CISEN, SEDENA, SEMAR, state and federal PGR). He said his main effort was building up state government institutions. Control de confianza measures coupled with firings of corrupt cops were cleaning up the police corporations, with 83% of state and local operational police forces now vetted. DTOs, he said, still infiltrate the forces, but with a continuous review process, there is less room for impunity and responsive performance over time is gaining public confidence. 7. (SBU) A single academy, Osuna said, now trains state and local police. 7,000 applicants applied in the last year but only 10% gained entrance. If police reform efforts were beginning to bear fruit, the governor said the next focus would need to be on deficiencies in the judicial system ("I want to put a judge in jail," he said, to demonstrate that judicial corruption was not beyond the law.) The Governor thanked USAID for support to the state's justice reforms and noted that he had signed cooperation agreements with 14 U.S. state attorneys general under a USAID-funded program to increase cooperation between Mexican and U.S. states. Baja California Norte, he said, will begin the transition from inquisitorial to accusatory trials in 2010 in the Mexicali judicial district. Other districts will follow after the appropriate training. 8. (SBU) Further briefings were offered by the State Security Director, Municipal Security Chief Leyzaola, and SEDENA General Alfonso Duarte who oversees overall interagency coordination between the military and federal, state, and local forces. The GOM shifted a planned meeting away from the Unidad de Inteligencia Tactica Operativa (UNITO), a fusion center concept the GOM is implementing in multiple regions, either because the center is not yet up and running or for simple lack of space. There did not seem to be a central location where coordination takes place but rather a virtual system that was largely personality driven. REQUIREMENTS AND REQUESTS - 9. (SBU) State-level SSP presented proposals to improve the performance of Mexican forces: better coordination of operations and information-sharing between Mexican agencies and cross-border, a more robust security force presence and better equipment for all forces, more drug treatment centers on both sides of the border, advance warning of repatriation to Mexico of prisoners freed from U.S. prisons, and U.S. notification of border incidents to the Mexican C4 (Command, Control, Communications, and Coordination) system in time for the Mexicans to react. The key ask from Municipal Dirctor Leyzaola was for equipment (primarily vests and armored cars), and training in professionalism and leadership. 10. (SBU) The Governor made limited appeals for USG assistance. He noted he had asked California Governor Schwarzenegger in an October meeting to share biometric data of prisoners being released and repatriated to Mexico, and for coordination at the point of repatriation on the border. He suggested a road along the southern side of the border fence to facilitate patrols and positive control of the borderline. He spoke positively of a "culture of legality" in the U.S. and noted that the drug fight is not just about confronting the cartels but must include programs to prevent addiction in schools. Finally, he asked for help turning around Mexico and Tijuana's perception problem, stating that Brazil is more violent than Mexico, Detroit is more violent than Tijuana, and California plays more narcocorridos than Mexican radio stations. He asserted that USG travel alerts that warn U.S. citizens not to visit Baja California severely damage tourism and the economy. A weak economy creates a fertile recruiting ground for the cartels. He asked for our help in turning around the image of Tijuana as a violent and unapproachable place. C-4 CENTER A GLORIFIED CALL CENTER - 11. (SBU) The team visited Tijuana's C-4 center later in the day. The C-4 is primarily a call center for emergency calls and does not have a strong analytical component. It handles city 911 calls (5,200 per day), and includes federal police and military liaison officers with links to the SSP's countrywide Plataforma Mexico data base. A filtering overlay has reduced hoax calls from 50% to 30% of total volume and a center in Mexicali fields state-wide anonymous tip (denuncia) calls. The 911 and denuncia numbers both receive calls regularly from U.S.-based callers, which as of mid-2009 can be made from the U.S. toll-free. An SMS/text message-based add-on interface is planned for 2010. SAN DIEGO LAW ENFORCEMENT SESSION 12. (SBU) Acting U.S. Attorney Kevin Kelly hosted the December 4 meeting in San Diego, with participation by San Diego-based ICE, FBI, CBP/Border Patrol, DEA, ATF, San Diego Police Department (SDPD), Chula Vista Police Department, San Diego Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department (LASD), Joint Task Force-North, and the Mexican Consulate. The meeting moved thematically from U.S. federal interagency coordination to state and local law enforcement cross-border coordination, intelligence architecture and cross-border information sharing, cross border investigations, and ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST). DG Valdes remarked he had never seen such a profusion of USG partners for Mexican efforts, nor a cross-border law enforcement gathering on this scale. U.S. Federal Interagency Coordination 13. (SBU) Kelly began with an outline of the Southern California region he represents: 141 miles of border, 6 Ports of Entry with many interstate transportation links, 7% of the U.S.-Mexico border but fully 60% of the border population. Drug caseloads Kelly said, are up 60% in fiscal year 2009 and the district sees more drug cases than California's three other districts combined. A well-situated crossroads for trade, the San Diego area is also suffering cartel creep, as pressure in Mexico pushes DTO leaders and operations north across the border. In response, agencies in the area have created numerous task forces to facilitate the collection, analysis, and dissemination of information across jurisdictions, agencies, and borders. 14. (SBU) Agencies also assign officers as border liaisons to work with Mexican counterparts. CBP briefed on a prime example of a tunnel discovered using tunnel detection equipment made available by NORTHCOM's Joint Task Force-North to identify a seismic anomaly one kilometer west of the Otay Mesa port of entry. CBP's sharing of this information with Mexican counterparts led to a USG and GOM operation to take down the tunnel simultaneously at both ends before the smugglers could finish construction. State and Local Law Enforcement Cross-Border Coordination 15. (SBU) SDPD briefed on programs to train local police in Tijuana, Rosarito, and Ensenada using a train-the-trainer approach. This kind of training on culture of lawfulness, community policing, and intel-led operations creates channels for information-sharing between SDPD and Mexican counterpart forces. SDPD reps also attend the funerals of slain Tijuana police to build trust and show support for their colleagues. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) runs one of the largest international police training sites in the U.S. In addition to the skills imparted, these programs too are a huge boost to trust and inter-operability. Intelligence Architecture and Cross-Border Intel Sharing 16. (C) OPAD stressed the critical role of vetting to give agencies the confidence to share information. Participants agreed that often cross-border liaison is built around a relationship between counterparts and is not institutionalized in the positions themselves. DEA stressed the burden assumed by Mexican officials receiving information from the USG, saying that they have lost Mexican colleagues because of information they shared. GOM interlocutors throughout the assessment stressed the need for greater intel sharing to guide operations south of the border. U.S. participants agreed this is key, but added a note of caution that intelligence alone will not turn things around. Intelligence is an input -- it does not direct operations and it does not reform institutions. Cross-Border Investigations 17. (SBU) The FBI field office described its approach to cross-border violence cases (primarily kidnappings). Critical elements include border liaison officers, proactive information-sharing, and a multi-agency task force focused tightly on kidnappings and extortion (and not straying into gang/DTO territory). When asked whether drug and other violence could really be disaggregated, the FBI rep agreed that complete separation of related crimes was not possible, but said steps such as co-locating task forces help integrate the law enforcement community while maintaining the discrete focus of individual task forces. The briefer offered a recent example where a dual-national was kidnapped on the Mexican side. Her family notified the FBI, which collected information from an informant who knew of a kidnapping crew operating in Mexico. FBI disseminated the lead to Mexican counterparts through its border liaison and Mexican police apprehended the crew and freed the hostage. 18. (SBU) Border Enforcement Security Task Force: The Mexican delegation specifically requested a briefing on ICE's Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST). BEST is the only task force in San Diego with an embedded Mexican official, a promising approach also in use at EPIC. Closing Comments 19. (C) The Ambassador closed by drawing out a few key lessons. To address these law enforcement challenges requires multiple agencies with multiple talents. Task forces, as cross-cutting entities, bridge jurisdictions and build trust. Intelligence and information collection function on several levels. In a rough cut, he laid out a continuum: community tips and information drawn from beat cops; tactical information derived from, for example, humint and judicial wiretaps; information on high value targets; and both intelligence and analysis on the operations of DTOs. Establishing such a framework on intelligence could also inform the architecture for sharing intelligence. Different aspects of intelligence sharing would require different protocols for sharing, disseminating and protecting information. He underscored that the issues covered in the day's discussion would only bear fruit when brought back to specific cases. The imperative to solve a case drives USG and the GOM to cooperate across the border and successful case establishes goodwill, durable communications channels, and an example for use in subsequent actions. CIVIL SOCIETY SESSIONS OPEN A DOOR - 20. (SBU) The team met with academics and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in separate meetings at the Autonomous University of Baja California (UABC) and the University of California-San Diego (UCSD). In Tijuana, the GOM organizers did not seem to understand the focus of Pillar IV. They brought in three academics working on immigration issues, who stressed that deportees are cannon fodder for the cartels and described GOM support to deportees. They said that unemployment in the state has tripled from two percent to seven percent in the economic downturn and is providing a boon to DTO recruiters, but did not have suggestions on how to turn the situation around. 21. (SBU) Former U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Jeffrey Davidow presided at the UCSD session, which was a much more varied and comprehensive exchange with NGO, business, and academic leaders. California NGOs and non-profits described their activities south of the border and speakers urged the GOM to strengthen NGOs rather than mistrust them. DG Valdes remarked that in the late 1990s, he was tasked with analyzing the "threat" from NGOs and came away with a strong appreciation for their ability to strengthen civil society. The Chamber of Commerce explained their efforts for several years have been on the Tijuana-San Diego metro area as one economic block. Chamber members include business people from both sides of the border, and their investment/trade promotion trips also represent both cities. 22. (SBU) COMMENT: This part of our evolving strategy has been the most uncomfortable for the GOM. Civil society organizations are often vocal in their criticism of the federal government, including the security strategy. What the GOM saw in San Diego was a strong and uniform support for Mexico. Academics, business, city and civil society leaders all echoed their interest in expanding cooperation in all sectors to the benefit of both sides. The message was "do not fear us, but let us be part of the solution to our common problems." END COMMENT. PASCUAL PASCUAL |
HEADER |
VZCZCXYZ0005 RR RUEHWEB DE RUEHME #0045/01 0122235 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 122235Z JAN 10 FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0028 INFO ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC RHMFISS/CDR USNORTHCOM PETERSON AFB CO RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC RUCNFB/FBI WASHINGTON DC RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC RUEABND/DEA HQS WASHINGTON DC XTAGS: XTAGPREL, XTAGPGOV, XTAGPHUM, XTAGSNAR, XTAGECON, XTAGKCRM, XTAGMX, XTAGPREL, XTAGPGOV, XTAGPHUM, XTAGSNAR, XTAGECON, XTAGKCRM, XTAGMX 10MEXICO45 |
TAGS |
PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX PREL PGOV PHUM SNAR ECON KCRM MX |
ADDED |
2011-05-19 12:00:00 |
STAMP |
2011-05-20 14:21:56 |
VOTE_POINTS |
0 |
VOTE_COUNT |
0 |
VOTE_RATING |
0 |
PRIORITY |
RR |
TWEETS |
0 |
MANUAL |
N |
SITELINK |
|
ISNEW |
N |
FINGERPRINT1 |
61497e07e6730eef7641904a8de7173d |
